How to relieve poverty in oil-rich third-world countries.
This entry was tagged. Energy Policy Foreign Policy Oil Poverty
So, apparently, the President has been negotiating an arms deal with the Saudi's. (Last I heard, it still needed Congressional approval.) Unfortunately, the State Department still doesn't understand the Middle East. Therefore, we're getting taken for a ride and -- assuming the deal is approved -- the entire Middle East will think we're morons of the highest degree. Why? Middle East observer Daniel Jackson comments.
One Hand Clapping > Blog Archive > The US-Saudi arms deal - a view from Israel
So, if I understand all of this, the US is giving the large men of Saudi Arabia $20 billion worth of high tech toys with no strings attached. ... Here is the first warning -- the Shah of Iran. Five years after the fall of Vietnam (the dread of the liberal left), Jimmy Carter lost the first round of this war without a shot. According to Professor Steve Brahms at NYU, it was largely due to the inability of the State Department to understand what Khomeini's value preferences were in the emerging standoff.
To the point, as history has shown, it was unthinkable to the State Department mind that a rational actor might prefer death (read martyrdom) to money. Who would not want to talk to the US and not get lots of money?
While the liberal left is worried that Iraq as another Vietnam, they are ignoring the first total failure of the post-Vietnam foreign policy culture -- Iran. Carter's failure, and the first complete humiliation of the US, was simply because of a refusal to work in the Bazaar. There is no market/capitalist mode of production out here.
As I mentioned before, negotiating in the Bazaar is not working the Market. Possession is everything and all transactions are conducted in front of all other actors in the Bazaar. Whoever wins is considered to be a Big Man because he was able to force the other person (the loser) to take a lower price or pay more than the item was worth. There is nothing here about mutual benefit -- whoever has the good has the power and dictates the price. Just look at Hamas's recent change in the price for Shalit, the Israeli soldier kidnapped (he was 19 then) last year. It is not about price, it is about power.
The worst, however, position to be in the Bazaar is to be the one who gives up something for nothing. This is the freier -- a term that can only be roughly approximated as a sucker, but this lacks the total humiliation of the term. The freier is the guy who gives up a good or does a job for nothing. Even the concept of "getting ripped off" lacks the appropriate derogatory abuse that accompanies being labeled a freier.
We're about to be the freier. The last thing we want is for the Middle Eastern nations to view us as imbeciles. But, if State gets the deal approved, that's exactly how we will be viewed.
Read Daniel Jackson's full commentary -- he provides much more information than the little bit I've excerpted here.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Information Warfare
The Weekly Standard: Fact or Fiction
The New Republic runs a piece in this week's issue titled "Shock Troops" (sub. req.) and authored by Scott Thomas -- described by the magazine as a "pseudonym for a soldier currently serving in Baghdad." "Thomas" is the author of two previous dispatches from Iraq for the New Republic, both of which recount deeply disturbing anecdotes (in one, an Iraqi boy who calls himself James Bond has his tongue cut out for talking to Americans; in the other, dogs feast on a corpse in the street). His latest piece is even more disturbing.
But is it true? The milbloggers at Mudville Gazette call it a pile of a horse manure by the second sentence.
Again, this doesn't prove Scott Thomas is a liar, only that if he is who New Republic claims he is, his ignorance exceeds that of any soldier of any rank I've ever met.
Read the whole takedown. Thomas's piece reads like enemy propaganda -- American soldiers are despicable and evil. Is Thomas really a soldier? Or he is a terrorist posing as a soldier? What proof does he have about these claims? Does TNR even know?
If true, these stories should be reported up the chain of command and the sick soldiers involved should be prosecuted. If they're not true -- and they certainly don't seem to be true -- why is TNR reporting them? Who, exactly, are they trying to help?
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq Troop Support
Odds are, if you only watch the mainstream media, you don't really understand what we're doing with the Iraq Surge strategy. Such military geniuses as Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid have already declared it to be a failure. But is it?
General Petraeus's right hand man, Dave Kilcullen, explains the strategy.
I know some people in the media are already starting to sort of write off the "surge" and say "Hey, hang on: we've been going since January, we haven't seen a massive turnaround; it mustn't be working". What we've been doing to date is putting forces into position. We haven't actually started what I would call the "surge" yet. All we've been doing is building up forces and trying to secure the population. And what I would say to people who say that it's already failed is "watch this space". Because you're going to see, in fairly short order, some changes in the way we're operating that will make what's been happening over the past few months look like what it is -- just a preliminary build up.
The meaning of that comment should be clear by now to anyone tracking what is happening in Iraq. On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual "surge of operations". I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.
These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another... These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.
When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation...
The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa'ida, Shi'a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on...
Read the whole thing. It's very enlightening and encouraging. Our commanders on the ground do have a plan and it is different from what we've done before. It just might work -- if we're patient enough to give it a chance.
As you wait, you shouldn't necessarily pay attention to any pictures or videos you see on television. They may not show what you think they show. Take Middle East protesters, for example.
I have actually seen some of these demonstrations, most recently in Islamabad, and all I would do if I were a news editor is ask my camera team to take several steps back from the shot. We could then see a few dozen gesticulating men (very few women for some reason), their mustaches writhing as they scatter lighter fluid on a book or a flag or a hastily made effigy. Around them, a two-deep encirclement of camera crews. When the lights are turned off, the little gang disperses. And you may have noticed that the camera is always steady and in close-up on the flames, which it wouldn't be if there was a big, surging mob involved.
...
On Friday afternoon in Manar Square, for example, I ran into Ohad Hemo, an acquaintance who covers Palestinian affairs for Israel's Channel 1 news. By then there was finally some media-worthy action. A few dozen Fatah-aligned fighters had shown up in the square, most traveling on the back of pick up trucks. They wore combat-style uniforms, although some wore street shoes instead of army boots. Their faces were covered in ski masks and they brandished weapons in what the Times called a "a show of force by Fatah." That sounds very dramatic, of course, but the reality was not very impressive: again, I felt as though I were watching a parody of machismo that seemed a bit silly, if not comic.
Other than stare into the camera and pose, the fighters didn't do anything at all. It was all pure theatre: I listened and watched as the various foreign television reporters positioned themselves in front of the masked gunmen and spoke seriously to the cameras about the rising tension in Ramallah, trying their best to make it sound as if they were in the middle of a war zone. But if their cameramen had panned out for a wider shot they would have shown crowds of mostly young men hanging around, eating snacks, buying cold drinks from vendors, and taking photos with their mobile phones. There was no sense of fear or menace at all. I even saw one photojournalist, who works for an American newspaper, giggling a bit as she aimed her camera at a masked fighter who was posing as if he were having his portrait painted, his eyes stonily focused on the horizon.
Give the generals a chance. And give the dramatic photos and videos of "protesters" and "freedom fighters" a pass. It's not reality, just theater. And not worth the attention we give it.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq Mideast
The fight in Baqubah continues. Drilling for Justice
American losses include one soldier killed in action, with 21 wounded. One Bradley and one Stryker have been destroyed. The low numbers of friendly casualties have been largely due to the slow, methodical clearing operation where success is not measured against the clock. In meeting after meeting, I have seen Townsend stress to his subordinate commanders the importance of moving deliberately and at their own pace. Given the massive amounts of IEDs that have been found, my guess is that we might have taken dozens more killed by now if the clearing operation had been rushed.
Fortunately, the Iraqi people are eager to help.
Other AQI edicts included beatings for men who refused to grow beards, and corporal punishments for obscene sexual suggestiveness, defined by such "loose" behavior as carrying tomatoes and cucumbers in the same bag. These fatwas were not eagerly embraced by most Iraqis, and the taint traveled back to the Muftis who sat in supreme judgment. Locals, who are increasingly helpful in pointing out and celebrating the downfall of AQI here, said that during the initial Arrowhead Ripper attack the morning of the 19th, AQI murdered five men. Townsend's men found the buried corpses behind an AQI prison, exactly where they'd been told to look for the group grave. Locals also directed Townsend's men to a torture house. Peering through a window, American soldiers saw knives, swords, bindings and drills. AQI is well-known for its macabre eagerness to drill into kneecaps, elbows, ribs, skulls, and other parts of victims.
One local Mufti who was said to have always worn a hood and sunglasses"”and to have somehow disguised his voice"”was pointed out to the Iraqi Army this weekend, who promptly captured him. Iraqi officials said today that although they did not previously know that this man was a Mufti, his name had been on their target list. The Mufti is being questioned and his name has not been released.
Yes, many of AQI's top leaders may have escaped -- but others may not have.
There are conflicting signals about how many of the AQI leadership escaped before Arrowhead Ripper launched. This weekend's capture of a possible high-value target in Baqubah indicates that not all AQI leaders successfully fled the city before the attack.
Media reports indicating that many top leaders escaped before Arrowhead Ripper began appear to be mostly true. But other information suggests some AQI leaders are trapped just down the road from where I write. In addition to the seven men who were caught trying to escape while dressed as women, there is information that some AQI leaders remain trapped in a constricting cordon.
Meanwhile, the battle for Baghdad continues as well. Iraq: We Won?
That's because Baghdad is the home of Saddam's staunchest supporters. These guys are prime candidates for war crimes prosecutions, for the many atrocities committed by Saddams' secret police over the decades. While the government has been willing to offer amnesty to many lower ranking Baath party members, the Baghdad neighborhoods and suburbs are full of people considered too dirty to qualify. This is the no-surrender crowd. But let's face it, these guys are also all over the lists Shia death squads carry. Iran has even offered cash rewards for the deaths of many Saddam lieutenants who were involved in the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, or subsequent murders of Shia clergy. The Kurds have their death lists as well. These are desperate and dangerous people.
Saddam's henchmen were no dummies. They were smart enough, and resourceful enough, to build a police state apparatus that kept Saddam in power for over three decades. For the last three years, that talent has been applied to keeping the henchmen alive and out of jail. Three years of fighting has reduced the original 100,000 or so core Saddam thugs, to a few thousand diehards. Three years ago, there were hundreds of thousands of allies and supporters from the Sunni minority (then, about five million people, now, less than half that), who wanted to be back in charge. Now the remaining Sunni Arabs just want to be left in peace. Thus the Sunni nationalists of Baqouba are shooting at, and turning in, their old allies from Saddams Baath party and secret police. This isn't easy for some of these guys, but it's seen as a matter of survival. While the Battle of Baqouba is officially about rooting out al Qaeda, and hard core terrorists, it's also about taking down the Baath party bankers and organizers who have been sustaining the bombers with cash, information and encouragement.
Unfortunately, the media is still unable to report on the true story. Instead, they get caught up in irrelevant details.
Both the terrorists and U.S. troops know that victory has been defined as several weeks with no bombs going off in Baghdad. The media is keeping score, and they use their ears and video cameras. No loud bangs and no bodies equals no news. That's victory.
Not really. The real war is within the Iraqi government. The terrorists lost two years ago, when the relentless slaughter of Moslem civilians turned the Arab world against al Qaeda. Journalists missed that one, but not the historians. The war in Iraq has always been about Arabs demonstrating that they can run a clean government, for the benefit of all the people, not just the tyrants on top. So far, there have lots of victories and defeats in this, and no clear decision overall.
It's very easy to explode a bomb on cue, for the media. It's part of information warfare. As long as the media believes that a suicide bomber represents an effective strategy, Baghdad will continue to be filled with suicide bombers. Why not? Right now terrorists know that strapping a bomb to your waist and blowing yourself up will lead your enemy to decide that he's being defeated.
Let's recognize suicide bombs for what they really are -- a desperate, last-ditch attempt at influence. Let's mock the force that's so weakened that it can only fight us by wiping itself out one fighter at a time. Then let's ignore the bombings as the distraction that they are and focus on the real task -- helping the Iraqis learn how to run a clean government.
Our government is dirtier than it should be -- but it's still better than Iraq's. Let's help their government become at least as clean as ours is.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Information Warfare Iraq
Not all of the news out of Iraq is good. Some of it is downright depressing.
But the political situation has deteriorated. The Maliki government may well be on life support. At least eight Cabinet posts are effectively vacant while two key partners in the pro-government bloc, the Fadila (Virtue) Party and Muqtada al-Sadr's group, have walked out. Another key group within the coalition, led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, has effectively switched to the opposition and is emerging as Maliki's most outspoken critic.
Thus, the Maliki government now lacks an effective majority in the National Assembly (parliament) and theoretically could be brought down with a no-confidence motion any day.
Worse still, the Shiite alliance, which provided the core element of political stability, has ceased to exist. Even Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the primus inter pares of Shiite clerics, no longer enjoys the unifying clout he did a year or so ago.
It may be premature to speak of political paralysis. But the fact is that the Maliki government has been unable to pass key items of its program. Crucial bills on the oil industry and the distribution of oil revenues remain bogged down in parliamentary committees. Also unresolved are such explosive problems as the status of Kirkuk (a city disputed between the Kurds and Sunni Arabs) and the creation of new federal entities.
The government's weakness also prevents it from setting a date and rules for the municipal elections needed to create local government units to end de facto control by militias in many parts of the country.
Our troops have been doing a fantastic job of kicking out Al-Qaeda and taking back Iraq. Unfortunately, military force can only take Iraq so far. At some point, the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government need to decide that they want to actually cooperate in making their country a peaceful success. Until they do that, little will change in Iraq.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
One Week of Operation Phantom Thunder
Al Qaeda prepared for the assault on Baqubah. "Days before the offensive, unmanned U.S. drones recorded video of insurgents digging trenches with back-hoes," the Associated Press reported. "About 30 improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, were planted on Route Coyote, the U.S. code name for a main Baqubah thoroughfare." About 15 percent of the western portion of the city is said to have been cleared, and the operation could take up to 60 days.
As operations in Diyala province are ongoing, Rear Admiral Mark Fox, a spokesman for Multinational Forces Iraq, stated Iraqi and Coalition forces are laying a trap for al Qaeda fighters fleeing the hot zones in the belts. "If you've got [the regions] properly cordoned then they're going to flee into somebody's arms. It's a trap," he stated. As we've noted since the beginning of the operation, Iraqi and U.S. forces have been placed in blocking positions along the rivers and key choke points.
Al Qaeda is left with fewer places to hide: Anbar Province no longer a safe haven, pressure has increased Baghdad and the hot operations in the belts, and the Shia south is hostile. Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salahadin, remain as al Qaeda's fall back positions, but Iraqi and U.S. Forces have prepared for this option. Some of the best Iraqi Army units are stationed in the northwest. These are seasoned units that have recently returned from supporting the Baghdad Security Operation.
... the purpose of the Baghdad Security Plan and Operation Phantom Thunder is to deny al Qaeda Baghdad and the Belts, and to kill as many operatives and leaders as possible in the process. When al Qaeda attempts to regroup, it will be in the hinterlands, and in some cases, in regions less hospitable to its actions.
Militants Said to Flee Before U.S. Offensive
In his news conference, General Odierno offered the broadest assessment yet of the multipronged American offensive around Baghdad that got under way this week, using the additional troops sent to Iraq as part of Mr. Bush's troop buildup. Despite the flight of the Qaeda leaders from Baquba -- a pattern that appears to have been replicated in other areas included in the new offensive, including Qaeda strongholds along the Tigris River south of Baghdad -- he adopted an upbeat tone, saying the offensive held "a good potential" for reducing the Qaeda threat to the point that American force levels in Iraq could be reduced by next spring.
First, he said, American and Iraqi troops would need to sustain their crackdown long enough for Iraqi forces to move into neighborhoods cleared of Qaeda fighters and hold them. This is a pattern American commanders have tried unsuccessfully before, as in a failed attempt to secure wide areas of Baghdad last summer. But General Odierno said Iraqi forces were "getting better," "staying and fighting," "taking casualties" and adding an additional 7,500 soldiers to their overall strength every five weeks.
Addressing the problems facing American troops in Baquba, General Odierno played down the significance of the Qaeda leaders fleeing ahead of the offensive, saying American forces would hunt them down. "I guarantee you, we're going to track down those leaders," he said. "And we're in the process of doing that. We know who they are, and we're coming after them, and we're going to work that extremely hard."
After more than three years of saying publicly that they had all the troops they needed for the war here, American commanders have begun acknowledging in the past year that the ability of the Qaeda groups to establish new strongholds after old ones are destroyed -- and to regenerate their leadership -- has owed much to the fact that American manpower has been severely stretched.
But with all the additional Army brigades ordered into the war by Mr. Bush now in the field, along with additional Marine units, the commanders here now have more firepower than they have had at any time since the American invasion in 2003. With that, the American generals face what they have acknowledged to be the best, and possibly last, chance to persuade critics in Congress and a disillusioned American public that persisting in Iraq is worthwhile.
Arrowhead Ripper: Surrender or Die
The combat in Baqubah should soon reach a peak. Al Qaeda seems to have been effectively isolated. The initial attack on 19 June achieved enough surprise that al Qaeda was caught off guard and trapped. They have been beaten back mostly into pockets and are surrounded and will be dealt with.
LTG Ray Odierno visited Baqubah on the 21st. Odierno clarified that this battle is to be final: we are not going to do this again. Odierno stressed to our commanders that they need to be thinking of an end-state that results in Iraqis taking charge, but that Iraqi commanders should not be given the reins until they are ready, so that the result is we set them up for success. Odierno's timing was remarkable: even before he arrived, the commanders here were talking about end-state daily and, on a more sour note, our commanders have their hands full with the local Iraqi commanders who seem less competent (to be kind) than those I have seen elsewhere, such as in Mosul.
Our guys are winning. Al Qaeda is about to be strangled and pummeled to death in this town, but the local Iraqi leadership is severely wanting. This was most obviously noted in one area in particular, where there were some slight indicators of a possible humanitarian need. "Crisis" certainly is not the correct word, but there are displaced persons numbering at least in the hundreds. LTC Fred Johnson actually took me out there. (The access even to "bad" news is amazing with this Brigade.)
I have been with LTC Fred Johnson for several days. LTC Johnson seems to recharge on sunlight or moonlight and can run a man into the ground. After seeing the humanitarian need building with no action to abate it underway, Johnson was very unhappy. He immediately started jerking choke chains on the people who are supposed to be handling humanitarian need, trying to avert having it build into a crisis.
This is where the inept local Iraqi commanders come in. I've seen them in meeting after meeting, over the past few days, finding ways to be underachievers. The Iraqi commanders have dozens of large trucks and have only to drive to our base to collect the supplies and distribute those supplies to the people displaced in the battle. Our troops are fully engaged in combat, yet the Iraqi leaders were not able to carry that load without LTC Johnson supplying the initiative. The Kurds would have had this fixed yesterday. The Iraqi commanders in Mosul would have fixed this. The local Iraqi command climate is disappointing by comparison.
There are serious technical problems that I have brought up privately to high-ranking PAO officers over the past nearly two years which persist today, despite that any one of them could be easily resolved with better planning on the part of PAO. I've found that communicating with them privately is generally useless. (Obviously, as the problems persist.) A person has got to tell a million people before they are heard. Since it will affect how the news from here gets reported, and since I know the other writers here are often afraid to speak up about this stuff (one senior PAO officer actually threatened to kick me out a few months ago), I'll take the heat on telling the million people:
I could be in combat now, but have been wasting time trying to get a badge to get into the dining facility. Got one. Not a big deal, until you add that up for 20 reporters all wasting part of their very limited time (we are in a war), and soldiers' time (they are fighting it) getting ridiculous paperwork when the Press ID could simply say, "Unescorted access to dining facilities is authorized. Please call DSN 867 5309 with any questions." Simple solution. I have wasted hours on the issue of eating over the past few days. It adds up when your time windows open and close unpredictably and rapidly.
On communications, senior Public Affairs officers knew this battle was unfolding. It would have taken practically zero assets to set up a media shack or tent in advance. The shack or tent only needs to have electrical outlets and an internet dish, along with phone lines. Cots would be nice but I can sleep in the dirt. (Sleeping arrangements here are excellent. I'm in a tent with soldiers and have a cot.) We need a dedicated dish and phone lines because for hours each day our RBGANS are not working, nor are our Thuraya sat-phones. All those reporters flooding out here are about to flood into difficult reporting terrain. Cell phones do not work in Baqubah.
Public Affairs should have known this months ago. Valuable stories about our soldiers and the battle are being lost and will never be filed because reporters, after a long day of being on the battlefield, cannot make a simple phone call, or file a story. Why be here? It's pretty dangerous, and insurance is expensive. I had to skip a mission this morning because I cannot make communications, and am down to filing stories on the fly again without time for editing. There is no other way to keep the flow open, and if you are reading this, it's only after I've wasted hours trying to upload it. Hours I could have been with our soldiers, telling about their days in one of the most important battles of this war.
Otherwise, the battle is going very well. A big fight seems to be brewing. As of about noon in Baqubah on the 22nd, there seems to be a lull in the fighting. A calm. This is about to get wet. At the going rate, al Qaeda in Baqubah will soon have two choices: Surrender, or die.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
Michael Yon has an update on the operations in and around Baqubah. Operation Arrowhead Ripper: Day One
Our guys are tough. The enemy in Baqubah is as good as any in Iraq, and better than most. That's saying a lot. But our guys have been systematically trapping them, and have foiled some big traps set for our guys. I don't want to say much more about that, but our guys are seriously outsmarting them. Big fights are ahead and we will take serious losses probably, but al Qaeda, unless they find a way to escape, are about to be slaughtered. Nobody is dropping leaflets asking them to surrender. Our guys want to kill them, and that's the plan.
A positive indicator on the 19th and the 20th is that most local people apparently are happy that al Qaeda is being trapped and killed. Civilians are pointing out IEDs and enemy fighters, so that's not working so well for al Qaeda. Clearly, I cannot do a census, but that says something about the locals.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
The battle for Baqubah continues. Bill Roggio has an update on how it's going.
Operation Arrowhead Ripper, the assault on Baqubah, kicked off with an air assault. Iraqi Army scouts accompanied elements of the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division. The operation in Baqubah is modeled after the successful operation to clear Tal Afar in September of 2005, which was designed and executed by Col. H.R. McMaster. The plan is to essentially "seal, kill, hold and rebuild." The city is cordoned, neighborhoods are identified as friendly or enemy territory, the neighborhoods are then segmented and forces move in with the intent to kill or capture the enemy. As both Michael Gordon and Michael Yon reported from Baqubah, the goal isn't just to clear the city of insurgents, but to trap and kill them in place. The combat operations are then immediately followed by humanitarian and reconstruction projects.
At last count, three U.S. combat brigades, two Iraqi Army Brigades and one Iraqi National Police Brigade in direct action at Baqubah. The number of Iraqi brigades inside the city may be growing, however. "Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said about 5,000 Iraqi soldiers and 2,000 paramilitary police were fighting," reported the Associated Press. "Iraqi forces said they took control of neighborhoods in Baqouba and were greeted by cheering people." This would equate to two Iraqi Army brigades (2-5 and probably 3-5). The "paramilitary police" is probably 1st Iraqi National Police Mechanized Brigade from Taji.
And homegrown Iraqi terrorist Muqtada al-Sadr isn't being forgotten either.
While the major offensive operation is occurring in the Baghdad Belts against al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent holdouts, major raids continue against Sadr's forces and the Iranian cells in Baghdad and the south. Two major engagements occurred against Sadr's forces since Monday -- one in Amara and one in Nasariyah. Scores of Mahdi Army fighters were killed during both engagements after Iraqi Special Operations Forces, backed by Coalition support, took on Sadr's forces.
The Iraqi government and Multinational Forces Iraq are sending a clear message to Sadr: when the fighting against al Qaeda is finished, the Iranian backed elements of the Mahdi Army are next on the list if they are not disbanded. Also, the Iraqi military and Multinational Forces Iraq possesses enough forces to take on Sadr's militia if they attempt to interfere with current operations.
Read the whole thing.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
The entire surge strategy -- to date -- has been a series of preparatory moves. General Petraeus and his staff have been busy positioning all of the pieces on the chessboard. Sure, they've made some changes in the way they patrol Baghad. But most of their plan has remained hidden, unseen, and dormant.
No longer. Yesterday, the plan went into effect. Now we see the strategy that General Petraeus has been waiting to implement. Now we see America's foremost counter-insurgency strategist make his move. Hang on -- this will get interesting.
Thoughts flow on the eve of a great battle. By the time these words are released, we will be in combat. Few ears have heard even rumors of this battle, and fewer still are the eyes that will see its full scope. Even now -- the battle has already begun for some -- practically no news about it is flowing home. I've known of the secret plans for about a month, but have remained silent.
This campaign is actually a series of carefully orchestrated battalion and brigade sized battles. Collectively, it is probably the largest battle since "major hostilities" ended more than four years ago. Even the media here on the ground do not seem to have sensed its scale.
...
Today Al Qaeda (AQ) is strong, but their welcome is tenuous in some regions as many Iraqis grow weary enough of the violence that trails them to forcibly evict AQ from some areas they'd begun to feel at home in. Meanwhile, our military, having adapted from eager fire-starting to more measured firefighting, after coming in so ham-fisted early on, has found agility in the new face of this war. Not lost on the locals was the fact that the Coalition wasn't alone in failing to keep the faith of its promises to Iraqis.
Whereas we failed with the restoration of services and government, AQ has raped too many women and boys in Anbar Province, and cut-off too many heads everywhere else for anyone here to believe their claims of moral superiority. And they don't even try to get the power going or keep the markets open or build schools, playgrounds and clinics for the children. In addition to destroying all of these resources, and murdering the Iraqis who work at or patronize them, AQ attacks people in mosques and churches, too. Thus, to those listening into the wind, an otherwise imperceptible tang in the atmosphere signals the time for change is at hand.
But now the AQ cancer is spreading into Diyala Province, straight along the Diyala River into Baghdad and other places. "Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia" (AQM) apparently now a subgroup of ISI (the Islamic State of Iraq), has staked Baquba as the capital of their Caliphate. Whatever the nom de jour of their nom de guerre, Baquba has been claimed for their capital. I was in Diyala again this year, where there is a serious state of Civil War, making Baquba an unpopular destination for writers or reporters. (A writer was killed in the area about a month ago, in fact.) News coming from the city and surrounds most often would say things like, "near Baghdad," or "Northeast of Baghdad," and so many people have never even heard of Baquba.
Well, if you read the New York Times this morning, you heard about Baquba as our military strikes insurgents' base east of Baghdad.
The American military began a major attack against Sunni insurgent positions here in the capital of Diyala Province overnight, part of a larger operation aimed at blunting the persistent car and suicide bombings that have terrorized Iraqis and thwarted political reconciliation.
The assault by more than 2,000 American troops is unusual in its scope and ambition, representing a more aggressive strategy of attacking several insurgent strongholds simultaneously to tamp down violence throughout the country.
The fighting is expected to be hard. In recent months, Diyala has emerged as a center of the Sunni Arab insurgency as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and other groups have made it their deadliest base of operations, supplanting Anbar Province. Violence in Anbar dropped after Sunni Arab tribes joined forces with the Americans to drive out Qaeda fighters.
If you want to know what's going down in Iraq and why it marks the biggest moment of the last four years, read both articles.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
Senator Lieberman on Iraq. A few excerpts.
The officials I met in Baghdad said that 90% of suicide bombings in Iraq today are the work of non-Iraqi, al Qaeda terrorists.
[Our commanders in Baghdad] point out that the crux of al Qaeda's strategy is to spark Iraqi civil war.
Al Qaeda is launching spectacular terrorist bombings in Iraq, such as the despicable attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra this week, to try to provoke sectarian violence. Its obvious aim is to use Sunni-Shia bloodshed to collapse the Iraqi government and create a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, radicalizing the region and providing a base from which to launch terrorist attacks against the West.
Facts on the ground also compel us to recognize that Iran is doing everything in its power to drive us out of Iraq, including providing substantive support, training and sophisticated explosive devices to insurgents who are murdering American soldiers.
One Arab leader told me during my trip that he is extremely concerned about Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but that he doubted America's staying power in the region and our political will to protect his country from Iranian retaliation over the long term. Abandoning Iraq now would substantiate precisely these gathering fears across the Middle East that the U.S. is becoming an unreliable ally.
Anbar was one of al Qaeda's major strongholds in Iraq and the region where the majority of American casualties were occurring.
When I returned to Anbar on this trip, however, the security environment had undergone a dramatic reversal. Attacks on U.S. troops there have dropped from an average of 30 to 35 a day a few months ago to less than one a day now. ... One of Ramadi's leading sheikhs told me: "A rifle pointed at an American soldier is a rifle pointed at an Iraqi."
In Anbar, for example, the U.S. military has been essential to the formation and survival of the tribal alliance against al Qaeda, simultaneously holding together an otherwise fractious group of Sunni Arab leaders through deft diplomacy, while establishing a political bridge between them and the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. "This is a continuous effort," Col. Charlton said. "We meet with the sheikhs every single day and at every single level."
In Baghdad, U.S. forces have cut in half the number of Iraqi deaths from sectarian violence since the surge began in February. They have also been making critical improvements in governance, basic services and commercial activity at the grassroots level.
The question now is, do we consolidate and build on the successes that the new strategy has achieved, keeping al Qaeda on the run, or do we abandon them?
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iran Iraq
This is a followup to my previous post on Iraq and political resolve. In the last few days, Gaza has exploded into open civil war, with Hamas and Fatah busy wiping each other out. In light of that, do you really think that leaving Iraq will decrease the violence there?
Wonder what Iraq would look like if we left to morrow? Take a look at Gaza today. Then imagine a situation a thousand times worse.
We need to stop making politically correct excuses. Arab civilization is in collapse. Extremes dominate, either through dictatorship or anarchy. Thanks to their dysfunctional values and antique social structures, Arab states can't govern themselves decently.
We gave them a chance in Iraq. Israel "gave back" the Gaza Strip to let the Palestinians build a model state. Arabs seized those opportunities to butcher each other.
...
Meanwhile, back home, the get-out-now crowd pretends that, if only we pull out our troops, Iraqis will magically settle their internal grievances (presumably, the way the Palestinians have).
...
We're stuck in Iraq, and it sucks. But were we to leave in haste, far more blood than oil would flow in the Persian Gulf. The disaster in Gaza's just a rehearsal for the Arab-suicide drama awaiting its opening night in Iraq.
This is why we have to stay involved in the Middle East. It's about more than just "stabilizing" Iraq. It's about imposing a new culture in the region. A culture that values life more than death. A civilized culture. Call me a cultural chauvinist, if you must. But I firmly believe that our culture is far superior to their culture. Now that we've destablized their country, the least we can do is to hang around long enough to teach them a better way to live.
How, well the Cato Institute's Project for Middle Eastern Liberty is a good place to start. While that takes root, we can certainly provide some security for those Iraqi's that want to learn.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq
Yesterday, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid admitted to being a jerk.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid confirmed Thursday that he told liberal bloggers last week that he thinks outgoing Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace is "incompetent."
Asked if Reid considered [Army Gen. David Petraeus, head of Multinational Forces in Iraq] competent, Reid responded, "Not as far as I'm concerned."
Reid has worked as a politician for the vast majority of his life. What, exactly, gives him grounds to determine whether or not a soldier is competent? He has zero military experience or background. He has no basis to judge competency. But he shoots off his mouth anyway.
By the way, great way to build moral there, Senator. Tell the troops that you believe their commander is incompetent -- that'll encourage them as they go out on patrol.
Michael Yon is a photographer, blogger -- and former special operations member of the U.S. Army. I trust his judgment about General Petraeus infinitely more than I trust Senator Reid's. Michael Yon has a tremendous respect for General Petraeus.
One of the reasons I trust General Petraeus is he just comes right out and says what needs to be said. The letter which he sent to our forces serving in Iraq (posted below) is a case in point. The letter is more important than it might appear on first glance.
We are making progress but the odds are still against us. We cannot take chances or play fast and loose with our own values. In addition to something immoral occurring, it could be the final straw for this war. All it would take is a weak leader behaving immorally, or a tired leader not recognizing the stress level of his soldiers and reacting accordingly, and we might have the proverbial straw that breaks this camel's back.
This letter from General Petraeus deserves the widest possible dissemination. It should be published widely, and posted on every headquarters wall, and read aloud by every troop in Iraq and Afghanistan. We can pummel al Qaeda and other terrorists mercilessly and grind them into the dirt, but we cannot afford to turn local populations against us while we do it.
Has Senator Reid written a PhD dissertation on counter-insurgency warfare? Heck, has he even read General Petraeus' dissertation on counter-insurgency warfare?
I've been reading General David Petraeus' Ph.D. dissertation between missions. The title page looks like this:
THE AMERICAN MILITARY AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era
David Howell Petraeus
A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
October 1987
In his dissertation, General Petraeus (Ph.D.) writes:
The Importance of Perceptions
Perceptions of reality, more so than objective reality, are crucial to the decisions of statesmen. What policy-makers believe to have taken place in any particular case is what matters"”more than what actually occurred. . . .
Here's a view of General Petraeus' surge strategy, from the ground.
If I might insert a personal opinion, I think Petraeus' plan has a serious chance of working despite heavy odds. In fact, within my first three days with 1-4, talking with Iraqi families and police, there were strong indicators that for this little neighborhood, local people and Iraqi police are definitely encouraged. This doesn't extend to the terrorists, however, and 1-4 Cav has been under fire.
Senator Reid, I'm giving you all due respect when I say, "Please, shut up!" You voted to confirm General Petraeus as commander in Iraq. You and all of your Democrat collegues. If he's incompetent, the only verdict that leaves for you is willful idiot.
Thanks for filling the role.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq Troop Support
Yesterday, the Guardian took a moment to point out that 3,500 U.S. soldiers have died in Iraq since the war started. Today, I'd like to point out another number: 29,000. That's the number of U.S. soldiers that died between June 6 and August 25, 1944 in the Battle of Normandy. Otherwise known as D-Day. That's more than 8x as many soldiers, killed in one battle, in a nation that had less than half the population that America now has.
The importance of the Iraq war shouldn't revolve around the number of soldiers killed. Our sense of winning and losing shouldn't be determined by a simple head count. Our verdict on the war should depend on our enemy and our goals. Our enemy is Al-Qaeda in Iraq and a host of other terrorist organizations. Our goal is to stay long enough and provide enough security to enable the Iraqi people to establish a free, democratic state. I believe that our enemy is hideous and our goal is worthy.
It's no use arguing about whether or not we should or shouldn't have gone into Iraq. It's done. That conversation is over. We're there now and we can't change that. The question now is: do we stay long enough to clean up our mess? Do we stay to finish what we started? Or do we pull out now and leave the Iraqi people to be slaughtered in mass, by terrorists. The terrorists will not stop killing just because we leave. If we pull out, the violence will only get worse. If we pull out now, the Iraqi people will lose any chance that they have at peace and prosperity.
The odds are against us and the situation is grim. But I do not believe that a simple body count is sufficient enough argument to dictate our actions. Pulling out now, after the historically small losses that we've received, is not worthy of our heritage. I believe that we must stay and do everything that we can to enable the Iraqi people to succeed where only one other Middle Eastern country has succeeded. Let's give peace and democracy a chance -- let's protect the Iraqi people and support the mission that our troops have volunteered for.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iraq Troop Support
The Palestinians continue to be in a bad situation. Michael Totten has been writing about -- and visiting -- the Middle East for several years now. He visited Israel last summer, during Israel's brief shooting war with Palestinian terrorists in the Gaza strip. While there, he interviewed an Israeli military officer.
At one point, they talked about the problem with terrorists hiding behind young children.
And ten, eleven, and twelve year old children come and take the launcher away afterwards. Often we're faced with fourteen or fifteen year old youth who come, armed, and place charges along the fence. When we see them, even when we see that they are armed, if they are only fourteen or fifteen we only shoot to scare them. We don't actually fire at them. Of course, only if there is no immediate danger to our forces.
"Our general instructions," he continued, "not just in the these cases, is if we see a militant who is armed, a terrorist, and there is no immediate danger to our forces, we don't fire if there is a danger that we would hurt the innocents, people who are not involved. But with that, it's important to say that when we have such aggressive fighting in populated areas, when there's an exchange of fire between terrorists and the IDF, there are cases where innocent people get hurt. But we warn as much as we can to step back, step away, to clear the area. So we see the terror organizations as responsible when civilians get hurt. And when there is a case and we know that a civilian was killed by mistake or unnecessarily, we check ourselves.
Sadly, the Israeli Defense Force is far more concerned about civilian casualties than the Palestinians themselves are. The Palestinians will actively put civilians in harms way -- then blame someone else for the inevitable consequences.
"About a month and a half ago," he said, "another event that shows you the dilemma here: Two terrorists with an RPG tried to shoot a tank. We shot back. In the same house the mother of them, and a cousin, were in the same house. They fired five meters away from where the mother and cousin were standing. The Palestinian headline said that a mother and child were killed. The child was twenty two years old. And he was a member of Hamas. So, I am not happy about the mother. But, this is my right. You know? In the houses of Hamas militants, and all the other terrorist organizations, there are storages of weaponry. That's because in the past we would avoid attacking houses with families. Which raises the question: Sometimes we as the IDF care more about the families and the children than he who would put them in danger. In a house, let's say of three floors, a whole floor may be used as a storage."
The Palestinians are woefully ineffective at fighting the Israelis, yet they continue to fight anyway. The ongoing struggle resembles self-immolation far more than it resembles war. Last summer, the Palestinian terrorists kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. How did that turn out for them?
"All the year, before Gilad Shalit, no one. In the Shalit event, two soldiers died. And after that one more soldier died from friendly shooting. That's all. So this is the big question for them. The spokesman of the government for Palestinians three days ago said the same thing I say all the time. For what? For what? For three soldiers who were killed in Gaza. In all the year something like 500 terrorists died in Gaza. So for what? The organizations of terror need to understand that it's not worth it for them. And they can choose. We left the territory in the Gaza Strip, so it's up to them. We will not stop the Qassam only with military pressure. They need to decide that they want to stop it. And if they will stop the Qassams, if they will stop the terror, free Gilad Shalit, we won't have anything to fight about. And Karni will be open more. And everything will be better for them, not for us.
Not very well.
A few weeks ago, Michael Totten's co-blogger Noah Pollah wrote about the conventional wisdom most people have about Gaza and Palestine.
The first is the notion that power would moderate Hamas.
The second is an idea that dates back at least to the start of Olso in the early 1990's. It is the belief that Israel must make concessions in order to validate and strengthen the Palestinian moderates and marginalize the radicals.
[...]
Yet Israel's withdrawal from Gaza happened just four months before the election, and the commotion surrounding that event distracted many people from taking note of what the withdrawal meant for the Palestinians themselves.
[...]
And what it meant for the Palestinians, especially the residents of Gaza, was that Hamas' fierce resistance over the decades had finally forced an Israeli retreat. It was the Shia reaction to the 2000 Lebanon pullout all over again, with Hamas playing Hezbollah. Hamas was able to campaign proudly on this victory, which was viewed as additional evidence of Hamas' strength and competence. And so it seems clear that a massive Israeli concession -- its departure from Gaza -- did not strengthen the Palestinian moderates at all, but in fact did the opposite: it vindicated the extremists, who unlike the moderates could declare a great victory and bask in the ensuing public admiration -- and collect a lot more votes when election day arrived.
[...]
Finally, there is the matter of foreign aid and its relationship to democracy-promotion. The Arab states and Iran have always spoken with great high-mindedness about the plight of their brothers in Palestine, but these regimes in practice have always lustily enjoyed seeing their brothers become permanent wards of UNRWA, settle into never-ending refugee status, and stagnate in extremism and violence. Since Hamas came to power, as David Frum helpfully notes, the gushers of largess that flow into the Palestinian territories have actually increased.
Gaza is a mess. And nothing we seem to do makes it any better. How bad of a mess is it? Well, right now Hamas and Fatah are engaged in civil war over control of the Palestinian government. How can you possibly fix an area that dysfunctional?
Both sides are taking a time-out from the hatred of Israel to waste each other. When they're not fighting each other, they're busy taking 500-3 losses at the hands of the Isaeli army. I don't think most people over there are rational any longer.
After reading these reports, I understand exactly why Israel wants to build a fence around Gaza. Maybe if we wall these terrorists in, we can look back over the wall in 50 years to see if anyone's ready to give civilization a try. Until then, why not prevent them getting to you to hurt you?
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy
On Friday, Fred Thompson reminded us of the importance of engaging the world with our ideas:
It's equally tragic that the U.S. is in no position to provide the victims of [Hugo Chavez] with the truth. There was a time, though, when Americans were on the front lines of pro-freedom movements all over the world. I'm talking about the "surrogate" broadcast network that included Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, often called "the Radios."
When Ronald Reagan was elected, he greatly empowered the private, congressionally funded effort and handpicked the Radios' top staff to bring freedom to the Soviet Union. Steve Forbes led the group.
Cynics still say that the USSR fell of its own weight, and that President Reagan's efforts to bring it down were irrelevant, but Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev say differently. Both have said that, without the Radios, the USSR wouldn't have fallen. The Radios were not some bland public relations effort, attracting audiences only with American pop music. They engaged the intellectual and influential populations behind the Iron Curtain with accurate news and smart programming about freedom and democracy. They had sources and networks within those countries that sometimes outperformed the CIA. When Soviet hardliners and reformers were facing off, and crowds and tanks were on the streets of Moscow and Bucharest, the radios were sending real-time information to the people, including the military, and reminding them of what was at stake.
Unfortunately, we scaled back the Radios and are in no position to use them to influence the Middle East or Latin America.
Fred Thompson mentioned that "we'll have a whole new set of media technologies" to use, if we start to stand up to today's dictators. It's true. Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez has forced Radio Caracas Television off of the air, for the heinous crime of disliking him. RCT has decided to keep fighting anyway. Instead of broadcasting their content over their airwaves, they are broadcasting it over YouTube. Last Friday, YouTube listed RCT as their most-subscribed feed of the week. Today's dictators will have a much harder time controlling the flow of information than yesterday's dictators. I think that's something worth celebrating.
Finally, if Iran's government is so peace-loving and wants only to be granted a measure of respect, why are the Iranians so busy clamping down on freedom in their own country?
Unemployment among young Iranians is about 50 percent. Some 40 percent of the population is on the government payroll, and there is not enough oil money to pay off all the people who do support the government (about a third of the population). Thus the government keeps printing more money, and the result in an inflation rate of over 20 percent. The Iranian people are getting increasingly restless, and, more ominously, surly. The government has relied on street level gangs of young Islamic conservatives to discourage such behavior. But it isn't working, and there have been more and more street battles. The government can more readily call in reinforcements, and has won all these brawls so far. But if the government starts losing them, it's the beginning of the end. Some of the kids have cell phones, a technology the government tried to keep out. The fear is that a street level disturbance will result in the protestors calling in their own reinforcements, defeating the security forces, and spreading. The clerics fear an event similar to the one that suddenly destroyed communist rule in Russia and Eastern Europe 18 years ago. For that reason, much attention and cash is spent on the street level muscle (the Basij militia), and a constant willingness to use physical violence against any protests or "un-Islamic" behavior.
There is a difference between the U.S. and our enemies. We need to remember that. More importantly, we need to highlight it whenever and wherever possible.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Fred Thompson Information Warfare Iran
Is it really possible for France to have a robust foreign policy? Normally I wouldn't think so. But French President Nicolas Sarkozy has me intrigued. He has appointed Socialist Party member Bernard Kouchner as his new foreign minister. Who is Bernard Kouchner? Michael J. Totten provides in intriguing profile:
Dr. Kouchner had had it. He knew communism was a mendacious lie. But the idea of "Workers Without Borders" (which, as Paul Berman notes, is what "Workers of the World Unite" ultimately means) stirred his soul, even so. Workers didn't inspire him so much as the idea of the abolition of borders. So he formed his own revolutionary organization of sorts, and he called it Doctors Without Borders. Doctors Without Borders was what the Red Cross would have been if an anti-totalitarian Che Guevara had founded it. Its missions, Berman writes, "were no less dangerous than any guerilla struggle, no less frightening, no less difficult, but [they had] the great virtue, in contrast to a communist insurgency, of refusing to lie."
... So Kouchner and Doctors Without Borders rented a French vessel and rescued some of the boat people. Scooped them right out of the sea. Some of his left-wing comrades burned with volcanic rage "“ rage against Kouchner for saving people! American imperialists, not the Vietnamese communists, were the villains in their mental universe. Kouchner showed up their fantasy as a lie, and they hated him for it.
Later Jimmy Carter dispatched the United States Navy to rescue the rest of the boat people. Doctors Without Borders were followed by Sailors Without Borders. This, from the point of view of the formerly communist and anti-imperialist Kouchner, was nothing short of fantastic.
Little surprise, then, that Kouchner "“ unlike many of his former comrades on the left "“ favored the humanitarian rescue of Iraqis from the predatory regime of Saddam Hussein. From Workers Without Borders...to Soldiers Without Borders. He became frustrated, apoplectic actually, at what he saw as the Bush Administration's arrogance and incompetence. But he supported the war all the same, and he did so strictly on left-wing grounds.
Sarkozy and Kouchner are giving me lots of reasons to keep an eye on France in the coming months.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy
Welcome to Information Warfare 101. This is a topic that the American public desperately needs to know about. The war in Iraq is not just a war of bullets and bombs. It is a war of ideas and information. Right now, our enemy is better at fighting this war than we are. We must win this war through information and ideologies, not through strategic bombing campaigns or overwhelming force. While overwhelming force is effective, it is not sufficient to win the war by itself.
What is Information Warfare? According to Kim Taipale, "information warfare is the protection, monitoring, disruption, or manipulation of information and information flows to improve one's own decision-making process or to degrade that of the enemy." It is making the enemy see what you want him to see and hiding what you don't want him to see. Information Warfare is the art of making your enemy react in a way that you want him to react by feeding him information that you have manipulated in some way.
Our terrorist enemies are masters of this type of warfare. They know that they cannot defeat our forces in an open fight. They also know that we have proven vulnerable to information warfare in the past.
We lost our first major information battle during the Vietnam war. In January of 1968, the Communists of North Vietnam launched a surprise attack against American and South Vietnamese forces -- the Tet Offensive. Their main goal was to provide the impression that American forces were not winning (and could not win) a fight in Vietnam.
The actual attack was a disaster. The North Korean forces suffered 35,000 dead, 60,000 wounded, and 6,000 captured. The American and South Korean losses totaled around 3,900. The attack was not judged in military terms, however. It was judged in terms of perception. The American media and the American people perceived it as a devastating American loss, mostly due to the surprise of the attack and the wide-spread nature of the attack. The Tet Offensive marked the beginning of the end of American involvement in Vietnam.
The goal of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and other terrorist groups, is to duplicate the success of the Tet Offensive. They are willing to take large military losses if, in doing so, they can convince the American people that the terrorists are winning.
Judging by the media coverage of the Iraq war, we are losing the information war. That needs to change. We can win in Iraq, but only if the American people are willing and able to look past the misinformation, lies, and distortions of the terrorists.
I'm willing to spend my time pointing out exactly where and when we're being lied to. Are you willing you follow along with me?
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Information Warfare Iraq Troop Support
The Iranians have kidnapped another American. Noah Pollak, writing at Michael Totten's Middle East Journal, has the details:
Haleh Esfandiari is the director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, and in December of last year she traveled to Iran to visit her ailing mother. In a statement on its website, the Wilson Center explains that in late December, "on her way to the airport to catch a flight back to Washington, the taxi in which Dr. Esfandiari was riding was stopped by three masked, knife-wielding men. They took away her baggage and handbag, including her Iranian and American passports." Her visit to a passport office four days later instigated six weeks of interrogations. Last Monday, just over a week ago, she was arrested and taken to the notorious Evin prison, where she stands accused of being a Mossad agent, a U.S. spy, and of trying to foment revolution inside Iran -- the same charges that were leveled at the American embassy staff in 1979 when it was taken hostage.
Noah reports that the Washington Post has warned Iran that they risk losing the world's "respect". American politicians have been, if anything, less forceful:
Several politicians have also weighed in, and they haven't done any better. In a statement sure to send an ominous chill across the Iranian political establishment, Barak Obama announced that "If the Iranian government has any desire to engage the world in dialogue, it can demonstrate that desire by releasing this champion of dialogue from detention." Haleh Esfandiari's senators, Barbara Mikulski and Benjamin Cardin of Maryland, asked Iran to make a "gesture of goodwill" to the American people by releasing their latest hostage. Respect, dialogue, gestures of goodwill. I'll bring my acoustic guitar and some big fluffy pillows and we can do a sing-along for Ahmadinejad.
Noah ties the recent hostage taking back to the 1979 imprisonment of the American embassy:
And the hostage-takers and the government that sponsored them never paid a serious price for the ensuing fifteen-month humiliation of the United States. Iran has also never paid for its various assassinations and bombings in Europe, the murder of hundreds of American marines and French soldiers in Lebanon in 1983, the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people, its lavish funding of Hezbollah and destabilization of Lebanon, the abduction of the British sailors, its nuclear program, and so on. In other words, the Iranian regime, since the first day of its existence, has seen its every provocation go unanswered -- which has perfectly reinforced its conviction that the West, and America in particular, is a brittle facade, economically powerful and technologically sophisticated but weak-willed, indecisive, risk-averse, and easily intimidated.
Somehow, I don't think that a desire for "dialog" is what drives Iran. I think it's a desire for power. And no amount of talking is going to convince Iran to stop bombing, kidnapping, funding terrorism, or refining nuclear material. I don't want to rush to war -- our military is stretched thin enough as it is -- but we need to do something more than just "talk" at the Iranians. As you can see, that strategy has worked out so well already.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Iran
For our troops fighting the war in Iraq, the number one threat isn't gun battles with terrorists, it's improved explosive devices left by the roadside. IED's cause fully 70% of American casualties in Iraq. This has been known for a while. What's also been known for a while is that Hummers do little to protect the troopers riding in them.
Unfortunately, most members of Congress have been too busy pointing fingers over the war to spend time figuring out how to help the military actually fight the war. Fortunately, it appears that some members of Congress are finally starting to see the light:
What my amendment will do is allow the military to put 2,500 more mine resistant ambush protected vehicles--known in the military by its acronym, MRAP--in the field by the end of this year. ... MRAP vehicles provide four to five times more protection to our troops than up-armored HMMWVs. That statement, that these MRAPs provide four to five times more protection than up-armored HMMWVs, is not my estimate. That is the judgment of our military leaders. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, GEN James Conway, with whom I spoke as recently as this afternoon, wrote on March 1 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said:
Multi-National Forces--West, that is, the Marines in Iraq [JK Background: specifically, in Anbar province], estimates that the use of the MRAP could reduce the casualties in vehicles due to IED attack by as much as 80 percent.
Let me explain the specifics of the MRAP. Each vehicle can hold 4 to 12 troops. Like the rhino, these vehicles have raised steel, V-shaped hulls and chassis. The raised hull is valuable because it gives the blast more time to expand, lessening the impact. The V-shape pushes the blast up the sides of the vehicle and away from the occupants. With an up-armored HMMWV or any humvee, the flat bottom sends the blast through the floor right into the occupants. In addition, the vehicles have side armor and bulletproof glass, and they also have tires that can be driven when flat.
Surprisingly, the person leading the charge on this issue is none other than Senator Joe Biden. While he often endures the nickname "Slow Joe", in this case he's faster out of the blocks than far too many of his colleagues. Good for him. Now let's work on getting some MRAP's over to Iraq.
This entry was tagged. Foreign Policy Government Efficiency Iraq Troop Support